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Title:

The Use of Near Miss in Maritime Safety Management

Degree:

MSc
Abstract:

Heinrich’s (1931) pyramid revealed that behind a major accident there are 300 minor
accidents or near-misses.

A Near-miss is an unplanned and unforeseen event which

does not cause injury or damage but which could result in injury or loss under different
circumstances.
accident is luck.

It is argued that the only difference between near-miss and actual
Considering Murphy’s Law “if it can happen, it will happen.” (Shcrǒ

der, 2005), if the contributing factors of near misses continue to exit, sooner or later, the
accident will happen in certain circumstances.

Near-misses are valuable opportunities

affording early detection of possible system weaknesses and provide an early chance for
correction before an accident occurs. The use of near miss in the high risk industries,
such as in Aviation and Nuclear Power, has been proved to be successful in safety
improvement, without necessarily experiencing actual accidents, as Jones, Kirchsteiger
and Bjerke (1999) noted.
By reviewing literature and experiences from existing program, this paper will identify
the value of near misses comparing with actual accidents in accident control, as well as
the barriers for near-miss reporting. In the end this paper will develop a pro-active,
systematic approach through which to manage near misses in maritime industry,
following the process: identification, data collecting, filtering and classification, cause
analyzing, solutions developing, dissemination, follow-up.
Key words: near-miss, barriers, Heinrich’s pyramid, Murphy’s Law, pro-active, system
Human element
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Chapter I: Introduction
1.1 The importance of the study
Shipping might be said to be a rather safe industry for the decreasing frequency of major
accidents, considering the billions of tons of material shipped on the high seas every
year.

However, Iarossi (2003) notes that the magnitude of damage inflicted by a major

shipping accident increases the public attention paid to those accidents, and negatively
influences the perceived safety of shipping.

American Bureau of Shipping (ABS)

( 2004, p. 7) reviewed that In the past several decades, accidents such as the Erica,
Exxon Valdez, Prestige, Amoco Cadiz, Braer, and Sea Empress have increased the
public and political pressure to improve the safety and have sparked the writing of new
laws or amendments to existing laws and international conventions in a reactive manner.
As shown in Figure 1, Heinrich’s (1931) well-known safety pyramid reveals that behind
a major accident there are 300 minor accidents or near-misses with limited loss or
damage. A Near-miss is an unplanned and unforeseen event which does not cause injury
or damage but which could result in injury or loss under different circumstances,
Borbidge (2004) noted.

It is argued that the only difference between near-miss and

actual accident is luck. Considering Murphy’s Law: “if it can happen, it will happen.”
(Shcrǒder, 2005), if the contributing factors to near misses continue to exit, sooner or
later, the accident will happen in certain circumstances.

We can’t control luck, but we

can prevent accidents by paying attention to the ‘early warnings’.

1

Chapter I:

Introduction

Maritime industry has been criticized as being limited and reactive by solving
yesterday’s problems.

Generally people focus on collecting data only on events that

meet the threshold of a reportable accident, and often with the objective of identifying
liability and culpability.

As a result, tremendous near misses remain uncovered.

Recognizing signals before an accident clearly offers the potential of improving safety,
and many industries have attempted to develop programs to identify and benefit from
near-misses reporting programs.

Borbidge (2004) addresses that the success of the

FAA/NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) and of the independent
Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting Programme (CHIRP) has led to the
development of similar schemes throughout the world.
The maritime industry has realized the importance of near-miss information which can
be used in risk management through a pro-active approach. On the world maritime day
in 2002, IMO (2002) stated that:
But, going beyond this, near-miss incidents are reported and investigated with
similar vigilance and effort as actual accidents, according to the company.

It

asserts that, by having a safety culture which encourages near-miss reporting,
improvements in risk awareness, revisions in policy, and installation of
additional controls has resulted in the prevention of further near-misses and
actual accidents.

Near-miss reporting trends are measured for each ship team

and the results used to improve continually its safety management system and to
help determine proactive safety programs. Hence having a positive near-miss
reporting trend is indicative of an effective safety culture (IMO, 2002).
However, there are only few near-miss reporting programs launched in maritime sector
within last four years, and they are suffering from low reporting level for reasons such as
prevailing blame-culture, hindsight bias, practical matters, etc. That means people still
can not take full advantages of near misses as valuable opportunities to find weaknesses
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and remedy them before accidents happen. U.K. Bureau of Transportation Statistics
(BTS) (2005) noted that the large majority of near-misses from which we could capture
useful data on accident precursors or on effective prevention strategies remain
unexposed. So it is meaningful to launch a systematic, pro-active near miss program to
identify contributing factors to accidents without having to experiencing accidents.
1.2 The objective of the study
This paper will identify barriers of reporting marine-related near-misses by briefly
summarizing the literature and exiting near miss reporting systems on possible reasons
for failing to report in general, and develop countermeasures. This paper aims to
promote a pro-active, systematic approach through which, identifying, reporting,
analyzing near misses in maritime industry, and developing, disseminating solutions in
wide scope, in order to reach the goal of accident reduction, and to create a safer and
more efficient shipping transportation system and mariner work environment.
The program will focus on identifying system failures, instead of blaming someone who
is supposed to be responsible for an adverse event, because blame does little help to find
the true causes.

So it does not matter who did it, only why.

When managed

effectively such an approach helps identify structural weaknesses in processes, and
hence, not only reduces the accident rate and intensity but also provides guidance for
overall system improvement.
1.3 Scope and methodology
Early into the project, the concept of “near miss” appeared in the lecture handouts of
Professor Shcrǒder Jens-uwe (WMU) helped to identify topic areas of greatest interest.
Emphasis in this research paper has been to collect information through a review of
literature. The combined Science Direct database and Google searching engine was
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used most frequently. Science Direct database contains a great number of journals and
research papers.

Key words used during searches were: near miss, safety culture,

accident investigation, incident reporting, near miss reporting, reporting barrier, and
accident prevention.
combinations.

The key word searches used the words individually or in

Over 300 books or articles were selected for review and possible

inclusion as references in this paper.

Most of the materials are from other industries,

such as Aviation, Nuclear, Healthcare, Railway, Chemical, etc.
In addition to the literature survey, Professor HONG BIGUANG, Captain, have given
great support by providing ideas and instructions. He is expert on maritime accidents
investigation.
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Chapter II: the value of Near-misses
2.1 What is near miss?
‘Near miss’ is a widely used term in the safety industry. Some individuals call a near
miss a close call, near hit, incident, or good catch. Near miss is defined in a variety of
ways by different authors.

Some of them are rather narrow while others are more

inclusive. A near miss, as defined by Van der Schaaf (2000), is an event in which the
unwanted consequences were prevented because there was a recovery by identification
and correction of the failure, either planned or unplanned. While some definitions are
very focused and based on the extent of the potential negative consequences, such as:
‘Near-Miss is an undesired event or sequence of events with potential to cause serious
damage’.

However, Tamuz (2003) prefers a broader definition which focuses not only

on the negative side of near-misses but also on considering their positive contribution to
safety management.

He views near misses as ‘improvement opportunities’ and

includes all operational disturbances, some of which have the potential to cause serious
damage while others are inconveniences that mainly cause inefficiencies.

Broader

definitions increase the probability of identifying potential problems at their earliest
stages, Muermann and Oktem, (2002) noted.
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2.2 The value of near-miss comparing with accidents
First let us review an example:
One sailor is painting the ship’s hull on a platform overboard in anchorage
station, suddenly, the rope hanging the board gets broken:
He falls down, but is saved by life belt, no injury.
He falls down into water without the protection of life belt; or he
falls down into water, although life belt has been used, it is not
proper used or get broken because of bad quality.
After falling into water, he easily stays on the water surface waiting
for help, because he has taken life-jacket before working.
He falls into water without life-jacket; the watchman throws a
life-buoy with line to him and saves him.
He falls into water without life-jacket, nobody notices, he gets
drowned.
This example is somewhat contrived, but it illustrates the point: the same initiating event
can result in several different outcomes, and the magnitude or severity of these outcomes
are dependent entirely upon the state of the system.
major accident happens.

Only in the last circumstance the

Other events can be called near-misses.

strength and weakness of the system.

They reveal both

It represents sources of information that could be

applied to the prevention of accidents if they were properly reported, analyzed, and
disseminated.

The US Coast Guard (2000) argues that these ‘non-accidents’ or

‘problem events’ provide an untapped source of data. They can be used as indicators
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of safety-levels in the maritime community and provide the information necessary to
prevent accidents before they happen.
2.2.1

Heinrich’s pyramid

Figure 1: Heinrich’s Pyramid
Source: Heinrich (1931)

The pyramidal structure of incidents, known as the “Safety Pyramid” is now widely
accepted. Near misses represent the lower portion of the pyramid. Heinrich reported
the following ratio for three different types of incidents: Major injury/ minor injury/
near-miss incidents = 1:29:300 (Heinrich, 1931).
It is intended to illustrate the fact that prevention need not wait until an accident
occurred, and that prevention should not only be aimed at the most severe consequences,
but also to events at the lower levels of triangle. Van der Schaaf (2000) likened
studying near misses to an iceberg in which much important data can remain hidden
from management view, unless it is brought to its attention.

Not understanding

near-misses can keep both managers and researchers in the dark about how to prevent
accidents, since near-misses are the precursors of accidents,” van der Schaaf (2000)
emphasized.

Hence, investigating near-miss is an effective and proactive means of

identifying and correcting hazards. The ratio triangles or icebergs are used profusely in
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industry today.
2.2.2

The Murphy’s Law

Murphy, a U.S. Air Force officer at Edwards Air Force Base in California, was quoted in
the 1950's as saying: "If something can go wrong, it will." The near-misses share many
causes and characteristics of actual events. Essentially, a near-miss is an accident that
almost happened. The only thing that stands between a near miss and an accident is luck,
as Gordon (1997) noted.

And luck can’t be counted on.

The underlying causes for

incidents are usually the same regardless of which part of the pyramid the incident falls
in.

In other words, an incident that causes no injury and is classified in the lower part

the pyramid could easily have been classified in the top part of the pyramid. By
eliminating or controlling the cause(s) of the minor injury or a "near miss", you can
often prevent a more serious injury from occurring in the future.
Marsh and Kendrick (2000) make a survey to assess whether near-miss and minor injury
information can be used to plan and evaluate injury prevention program.

After

analyzing causes of 350 near-misses and minor injuries of children between 3 and 12
months and comparing with actual medically attended injuries happened on 252
randomly selected children, that information was provided by the Home Accident
Surveillance System, they draw the conclusion: although some differences were found in
the causal factors surrounding non-injury and injury producing events, overall, similar
patterns in the circumstances surrounding the incidents were demonstrated.
If the conditions which gave rise to the near-miss are not addressed, the risk will
continue unabated; and sooner or later a full-blown accident will occur, with all its
attendant consequences.

For this reason, a near-miss should be investigated with the

same diligence as an accident.

Indeed, in reviewing catastrophes, precursor events that

had occurred on previous occasions but did not lead to accidents are often discovered.
An example represented by Vaughn (1997) that, prior to the Challenger explosion (in
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1986 when the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded) engineers had identified and reported
degraded O-ring seals dating back to 1982.
2.2.3

Rich in number

Bird and Germain (1996) noted that, one of the most attractive aspects of near-miss
analysis is the abundance events compared to actual accidents.

Decision making about

investing in safety improvements is usually based upon the relative importance of root
causes in accidents and failures. Near-misses occur 3 to 300 times more frequently,
enabling quantitative analysis, Barach (2000) said.

They represent a rich source of

information that can be used to project extreme events, determine risk exposure, and
assess risk mitigation measures.

Reason (1997) addressed that, it is valuable especially

for high reliability industries where actual accidents are so infrequent that “lessons”
from relatively minor accidents is essential for avoidance of major accidents.
2.2.4

Contains more information

The U.S. National Academy (NA, 2003) mentioned that, after an accident, it may be
difficult to determine what actually occurred for a variety of reasons: damage can be so
severe that accident reconstruction may be inaccurate; legal and financial concerns may
create disincentives that affect the investigation; and witnesses may be unavailable.
Occasions arise when there is nobody alive to tell the tale and the process of
reconstruction becomes even more difficult.

For instance, ships sink, sometimes

without trace, or the damage can be so severe that accident reconstruction may be
inaccurate. Such as, Derbyshire, the biggest bulk carrier in U.K. at that time, sank with
the loss of all on board in 1980, but it was more than a decade before the wreck was
located and a comprehensive underwater survey carried out in an attempt to find out
why the ship had sunk (IMO, 1999, p.1). It is almost impossible to find the true causes
of that accident.

The lengths to which it has proved necessary to establish the cause of

loss, and the costs of so doing have been and are continuing to be extensive.

9

Chapter II:

the value of Near-misses

After an accident, individuals or organizations may be unwilling to disclose information
that could increase their liability, or they may share information selectively.

However,

as Eqbal (2005) argued, near-misses are far more common than actual accidents, there is
far less guilt hangs over the discussion of a near-miss.
more effectively reduced.

In this way, hindsight bias is

More safety information is likely to be revealed.

In addition, near misses can also reveal the strengths in the system.

The example (in

first paragraph of 2.2) reveals that the one of the following barriers may have prevented
the death of the sailor:
Pre-checking the line to be used, to ensure it is in good order and quality;
Wearing life-jackets;
Arranging watchman during overboard working time, etc.
Analyzing near-miss can also help to identify the barriers that prevent adverse situations
from developing into a major accident.

They can yield significant insights because

they tell us about potential protection mechanisms that might be used in similar
circumstances.

Barach (2000) emphasized that successful recovery information, which

offers learning opportunity, can also be captured, studied, and used for improvement.
2.2.5

Low cost

Collecting and analyzing near misses provides an opportunity to learn about system's
latent weaknesses, without having to experience painful consequences arising from an
actual accident.

Although the cost of maintain an incident reporting schemes is high.

However, it is much lower than that of from some major accidents.

Accidents can have

a number of direct costs, such as medical expenses, costs associated with employee
convalescence, and equipment damage, property loss, etc. In contrast, U.S. National
Academy (2003) noted that near misses may have minimal if any direct costs.
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Accidents also have a number of indirect costs that may far outweigh the direct costs.
For example, In March 1989, the oil tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground in Alaska's
spilling more than 230,000 barrels of oil. The oil washed up on more than 1,300 miles
of ecologically rich coastline. Exxon bore about $2 billion in clean-up costs, and
another billion in damages and penalties. More than a decade later, harmful effects on
the ecosystem and the fishing industry still linger.

Furthermore, Mouat (2003)

addressed, by operating such system, the safety awareness in the whole industry will be
increased. It is quite valuable in a long run.
2.2.6

Be pro-active

Traditionally shipping take reactive approach to prevent the recurrence of accidents.
For example, Maritime Environmental Protection Committee (MEPC) was established
following Torrey Canyon oil spill, ISM code originated from Herald of Free Enterprise.
Maritime accident investigation has been criticized as being limited and reactive by
solving yesterday’s problems.

In response, U.K. Maritime and Coastguard Agency

(MCA) developed “Formal Safety Assessment” (FSA) for the International Maritime
Organization.

As Peachey (2001) reviewed, FSA is a decision support tool for

maritime regulators, based on risk and cost-benefit assessments.

Paralleling with that,

the approach through which capturing, analyzing near-misses, and disseminate safety
information to related organization or individuals becomes proactive and predictive.
Near-miss events afford early detection of possible system weaknesses and provide an
early chance at correction.

Hence the near-misses at the base of the accident triangle

are often referred to as “preventative opportunities”.

Therefore, near-miss management

perfectly fits into the category of proactive measures, Oktem (2002) argued.
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Chapter III: Learn from existing programs
Because of the inherent value of using near-misses to mitigate the risk of accidents,
catastrophes, and other extreme events, a number of industries have developed analytical
techniques and management approaches to detecting, modeling, and acting on precursor
signals.

Especially in high-reliability industries, for instance aviation, nuclear power

plants.

The characteristic of such of kind of industries is that, the number of major

accidents is few, there is not so much experience can be learned from these major
accidents, however, once a major accidents happened, it will be catastrophic.

Recently

near miss program has been introduced in other industries, such as railways, healthcare,
maritime, etc.
3.1 Aviation
The airline industry has led in the advancement of incident, near-miss, and safety
reporting systems to capture potential precursor information. Most frequently used as
an example is the United States Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), a
well-established national near miss database, which was established in the middle 70’s
in response to outcry over a particularly serious aviation disaster.

ASRS aims to collect,

analyze, and respond to voluntarily submitted reports of unsafe aviation situations in
order to lessen the likelihood of aviation accidents.

Key features of this program are its

anonymity provision, its administration by a neutral party (the U.S. National Aeronautics
and Space Administration –NASA), worker/management support, and regular feedback
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given to the reporting population (through a newsletter and alert bulletins). It is highly
successful in its mission of disaster prevention on.
Another example, as Tait and O'Neil (2003) reviewed that, U.K. Confidential Human
Factors Incident Reporting Program (CHIRP) was founded in the early 1980s to serve
the aviation industry. CHIRP reports are handled on a strictly confidential basis, no
personal details are retained from reports received.
Beaubien (2002) introduced that the Australian Confidential Aviation Incident Reporting
(CAIR) System is Australia’s analog to ASRS and CHIRP.

Like its counterparts,

CAIR is a voluntary, confidential, and non-punitive incident reporting system that was
established to proactively identify safety-related deficiencies and to suggest appropriate
remedies.
3.2 Nuclear
The International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG, 2002) addresses that,
because of its high reliability, Nuclear industry gets few opportunities to learn from
actual accidents.

The nuclear power industry has adopted a similar approach to

gathering safety information to complement its traditional data-collection methods.
Every time a precursor event is observed during the operation of a nuclear power plant,
the event is analyzed to reassess the measures being used to mitigate against future risk
exposure. Tamuz (2004) addressed, in this way, the nuclear industry has been able to
improve continuously the safety of plant operations based on empirical data from
precursors without experiencing any catastrophic events.
3.3 Health Care
U.S. National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA, 2003) reviewed that NPSA is a special
health authority formed in 2001 for learning from adverse events and near misses
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improve patient safety by promoting an open and fair culture in the National Healthcare
System (NHS).

During the period September 2001 to June 2002, 28998 reports were

submitted to NPSA electronically. The outcome was categorized in 27,162 of the
reports.

Of these, 25,660(94%) had a minor outcome or no outcome at all.

approach is adopted in U.K. in 2004.

A similar

It is the biggest healthcare information system of

its type in the world (www.npsa.nhs.uk).
3.4 Maritime
Japan (2001) had conducted an investigation into near miss incidents relating to
operations on ships’ navigation bridge by questionnaire and interviews with seafarers
(captains, officers and pilots) of Japanese flag vessels in 1997 and submitted the report
to the Committee (MSC 69/INF.16, MSC 71/INF.8, MSC 72/INF.9).

By analyzing

over 2,000 answers to the questionnaire they draw the conclusion that about 70% of
near-misses are caused by or related to human errors.
In 2003 the Department for Transport U.K. extended its CHIRP program to the Maritime
industry, carrying out research on the causes of maritime near misses and accidents
through a confidential reporting system for the collection of Human Factors-related
safety issues.

In the first year there are 70 reports in the database.

have been forwarded to other related organizations for evaluation.

Of those 70, 42
Powell (2004)

revealed that many of the reports have resulted in positive action being taken and all
have raised awareness of particular issues or perspectives. Reports are published in
CHIRP’s Maritime Feedback, a quarterly newsletter.

It has also a hard copy circulation

of 130,000 and is also widely circulated by e-mail.
The Australian Confidential Marine Reporting Scheme (CMRS), founded in 2004,
aiming to improve safety in Australian waters by enabling the Transport Safety Bureau
(ATSB) to receive, assess and act on confidential reports to prevent, or reduce, the risks
of marine accidents (CMRS, 2004).
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Confidential, independent outsourcing of report collection and analysis, voluntary, rapid
meaningful feedback, and ease of reporting are the common characteristics of above
mentioned program.

That will offer lessons applicable to the design of safety reporting

systems in maritime industry.
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Chapter IV: Barriers for reporting
The indicator of the success of near miss program is largely based on the reporting level,
in other words, the reporting rate.

Heinrich (2001) noted that under-reporting

continues to be a major limitation of most incident reporting systems.
Harper and Helmreich (2005), both are affiliated with the Human Factors Research
Project at the University of Texas at Austin. Their studies have shown that many
physicians are reluctant to participate in programs to report medical errors, and that
underreporting of adverse events may be as high as 96 percent.

Findings from this

survey clearly point to reporter protection as being among the most critical elements
influencing the use of a reporting system.

Powell (2004) also points out that the

CHIRP maritime program in U.K. only received 70 reports in the first year.

In a survey

of reporting in 53 US hospital blood banks and transfusion services, Schreiber (2001)
found that 91% of respondents always reported events with harm, but only 8%
consistently reported near-misses that they corrected themselves, and in fact, 73% never
reported such near-misses.
The low level of reporting reveal there are significant yet identifiable barriers for
implementing a successful reporting system.

Webb (1989, p.117) pointed out that the

attribution of responsibility and blame as a filtering factor in reporting. O’Leary (1995,
p.124) mentioned that there is a high pressure from society to allocate blame and punish
someone.

From operational aspect, van der Schaaf (2004, p.60) noted lack of time, the

16

Chapter IV:

Barriers for reporting

complexity of reporting forms, and lack of training and awareness have all been cited as
barriers to reporting. Others have cited additional barriers to reporting, including lack
of confidence that a report will result in safety improvements and lack of time to
complete the report and still complete other tasks.

Bridges (2000) pointed out that

extra work, scepticism, lack of trust, fear of reprisals are also powerful disincentives to
reporting.
The factors influencing incident reporting can be grouped into following categories:
4.1 Be afraid of being punished
The major reason is that they are afraid of being punished for the prevalent blame
culture in the world. The blame culture has been part of human culture ever since
Adam blamed Eve for eating the forbidden fruit.

The Council of Europe (2005, p.8)

addressed that, traditionally thinking, if people try hard enough, they will not make any
errors; if we punish people when they make errors, they will make fewer of them; that
remedial and disciplinary action will lead to improvement by channeling or increasing
motivation.
However, in the vast majority of situations this is either ineffective or even
counter-productive, Dunn (2004) pointed out. It’s human nature to cover things up for
fear of criticism and reprisal. In addition, he noted that, the statement referring to near
miss providers’ concern that their report would not be truly anonymous was stated as
follows: “Despite not having to give my name, I would still worry that I could be
identified by a report I submit to an anonymous reporting system.”

Individuals may

fear that they would loose their jobs, fear that their career prospects would be
jeopardized, and fear that they would face civil or even criminal prosecutions.

Besides,

people don’t want to get someone else in trouble, so they are reluctant to report incidents
done by others.

Unfortunately, most reporting systems lack the funding and the

necessary managerial support to provide this level of assurance.
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In addition, North of England P&I (January, 2005) pointed out, the criminalization of
mariners is nothing new.

If an accident occurs there will be possibly severe

punishment, perhaps without any reference to fault or liability.
keeping quiet.

So it is then a matter of

With luck, things can be kept hidden not just when it comes to

near-misses but also when accidents do happen, and a promised bonus for an
unblemished accident record can then be paid out.
4.2 Work overload
Through research, Andersen (2002) found that respondents feel reporting entails
increased workload.

For practical reason, a near-miss reporting form may be time

consuming and inconvenient to fill out. Crew on board have always suffered from
excessive paperwork. Vander der Schaaf and Kanse (2004) addressed that provider
who is already burdened by long work days will be reluctant to take the time out of a
busy schedule to report a mistake.
4.3 Safety bias
Van der Schaaf (2004, p.60) observed that people soon find incident reporting useless
when no one ever reads and uses the reports. If near miss reports are collected and the
information is not evaluated and disseminated and no action taken, workers will become
discouraged and stop sharing.

Residents might be reluctant to report and discuss near

misses because they feel powerless to effect change, said Michael Couturie, MD, a
second-year resident at Temple University Hospital in Philadelphia (Iqbal, 2005).
Leveson (1995) points out operators often intervene to ‘cover up’ a potential failure by
taking immediate action to restore a nominal state.

In many instances, individuals may

not even be aware that such necessary intervention should be reported as a focus for
potential safety improvements.
Arise from lack of safety awareness, even that the staff from the management level does
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not realize the benefit from learning near-misses.

Van der Schaaf (2004, p.60) found

that incidents might be seen as ‘part of the job’, and people may think near-misses can
not be prevented.

Because of their less dramatic end states, near misses may seem less

salient as lessons learned than accidents.

For example, March (1991, p.5) noted

corrective actions developed in response to near misses may be less persuasive and more
open to question than corrective actions based on actual accidents.

The U.S. National

Academy (U.S. NA, 2003) addressed that decision makers may pay less attention to
precursors than to accidents, and it may be difficult to persuade them to make changes in
technical or organizational designs based on observations of precursors.

Furthermore,

Christopher (2003) argued that this barrier is typically related to the fact that people
never truly know how many accidents have been prevented by improved near-miss
reporting.
4.4 Lack of resources
Hong & FU (2003, p.15) pointed out that, ideally all minor incidents should be
investigated, but it is impossible for lack of resources.

Similarly, U.S. National

Academy (2003) addressed, because near misses are likely to be numerous, resource
limitations may make it impractical to investigate all of them to the level of detail that
would normally be used in an accident investigation. It can be expensive both to set up
and to maintain the near miss reporting system.

In order to get these reported date well

managed and analyzed, skilled staff is indispensable.
analyzing near misses is also time-consuming.

The process of managing and

There are often insufficient resources to

perform a detailed study of the context in which an incident occurred.
4.5 Difficult to submit the report
As the main source of near-miss reporting, seafarers spent most of time on board, about
6 to 10 months every year. Some ships may seldom or never call their flag states or
registered ports.

It is hard to get reporting forms and send them to right place. No
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internet, telephone, or mail is available on board.
4.6 Business pressure
The difficulty for the seafarer, particularly the master at times, is maintaining the safety
first approach in the face of pressures outside of the ship and company, for instance, the
pressures from port authorities, pilots, stevedores, agents and others with an investment
in the ship and its cargo but not necessarily an interest in the safety of the crew.
A concern is that reporting potential problems to government regulatory agencies may
result in the information becoming accessible to the public, including the media, which
could be embarrassing, bad for business, or worse, Christopher (2003) noted. It is
nature for the employee and managers to be afraid of being identified and publicized
after the near-misses happened to them are reported.

If there are many near misses in a

ship are reported, it will give others the impression that the ship is not safe, and there is
no need to do business with them.
Although, the values of near misses have been reviewed above, we can’t ignore the fact
that, no matter to what extent the safety awareness of participants will improve, near
miss can never be treated exactly equally as actual accidents, during the process of
reporting, evaluating, decision-making, etc.
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Reason (1997) listed five important factors for ‘engineering a reporting culture’:
indemnity against disciplinary proceedings, confidentiality or de-identification,
independent from the regulatory authority, as well as rapid, useful, accessible and
intelligible feedback to the reporting community, and finally, the ease of making the
report. In addition, Lucas (1991) suggested that the use of information in the database
(feedback, statistics, and error reduction strategies) and the nature of the organization of
the scheme (centralized or local, mandatory or voluntary) contribute significantly to a
reporting scheme’s success or failure.

Wald (2004) describes the characteristics of

incident reporting systems: focus on near-misses, provide incentives for voluntary
reporting, confidentiality, and emphasize systems approaches to error analysis.
5.1 Legal protect
It is important that the legal framework is in place to run a reporting system.

Even the

most well meaning management will have problems to build and maintain trust if legal
action can still be undertaker against participants.

In order to encourage reporting,

there need break down legal barriers in existing laws need to be revised. For instance,
the Maritime Traffic Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China (1984), being
accepted as the constitution of maritime law of China, of which article 43 addresses that
the competent authorities shall ascertain the cause of the accident and fix the
responsibility for it.

Almost all maritime laws in china give us a signal that anyone
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who is responsible for an incident is subjected to be blamed.

The actions include

warning, license withdrawing, license suspending, fining, and even criminal accusing.
Such as the Provisions of the People’s Republic of China on Marine and Maritime
Administrative Punishment (2003), of which regulation 36 addresses that even to minor
accidetns the the action to the seafarers who is responsible is suspension of license at
least 3 months.
A guarantee of reporter protection from legal discoverability or disciplinary action could
increase their motivation to use a reporting system.

Evidence of the motivating power

of this type of guarantee in increasing reporting rates can be found in aviation.

For this

reason, Helmreich and Harper (2005) address that NASA goes to great lengths to
publicize the rules that protect the identity of contributors to the US Aviation Safety
Reporting System.

The impact of these changes and the power of immunity or a

non-punitive process were demonstrated by a large increase in reporting rates that the
program experienced over 8 years following enhancements in the immunity policy.
Legal impediments such as civil litigation, regulatory sanctions, criminal proceedings
and public disclosure are major deterrents to improving aviation safety through
enhanced safety information collection and sharing.

One example of an effort to

encourage collection of the information needed to effectively correct safety deficiencies
is Chapter 3 of Annex13 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (1944) which
states “the sole objective of the investigation of an accident or incident shall be the
prevention of accidents and incidents.
blame or liability.”

It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion

In addition, U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA, 1999) reviewed that there was an agreement from the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) to grant pilots immunity from punishment in return for voluntary
submission of reports.
Nørbjerg (2001) describes that, in 2001, a new law was passed by the Danish Parliament,
mandating the establishment of a strictly non-punitive and strictly confidential system
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for the reporting of aviation incidents.

The law would grant freedom from prosecution,

even though the reporter had committed an erroneous act or omission that would
normally be punishable.

Investigators would, by law, be obliged to keep information

from the reports undisclosed.
It is obvious that for the scheme to be successful, reporters must have the utmost
confidence that the confidentiality will not be breached. The provisions regarding
regulating the behavior of investigators should be included, in order to ensure the
identity of reporters will not be publicized. Their general duties include an obligation
to ensure a full, independent and objective investigation.

It is also important to clearly

define permissible uses for the data.
Once the investigators or other staff of the program breach the regulation the legal action
will be taken against them.

The organization should have written policies and

procedures on event reporting. Procedures for timely submission of event reports and
action to investigate and follow up on events should be established.
There is generally a threshold above which some type of punishment may apply.
Tamuz (2001) argued that a regulatory agency must make a critical trade-off between its
responsibility to maintain accountability and its responsibility to identify and avert
accident precursors.

Disciplinary action will only be considered in clearly defined

occasions, namely where there has been a breach of law, willful negligence or
professional misconduct.

That should be clarified in the regulations.

5.2 Management commitment
And also the use of a reporting system is largely dependent on management perception
of the value of such a system. At the least a voluntarily reported near miss should
never have any negative repercussions for those reporting it. Van der Schaaf (1995,
pp.1241-1242) noted that organization leaders must be involved in the development and
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implementation of precursor programs and must have a clear understanding of each
program’s structure, merits, and potential vulnerabilities. Pidgeon (1998), Toft and
Reynolds (1997) noted that, management has an important role for shaping an
organization’s culture.

With management commitment, employees will be willing to

report safety concerns because they believe it is their responsibility to do so, because
they are encouraged by their co-workers, because they know their management will
respond to their concerns and because they know they will receive continuing feedback.
Ives (1991) describes nuclear “near miss” reporting systems where an established
reporting mechanism was destroyed through a change in management demonstrates the
necessity of management understanding and involvement in a reporting system.

In his

example high numbers of incident reports started to be used as a negative indicator of
plant manager performance.

The numbers of reports dropped to almost nothing and

valuable preventative information was lost.
5.3 Be independent
The concept of independent incident investigation has been widely used around the
world in various industries.

The program should be independent of any authority with

power to punish the reporter or the organization. It should be administered by an
impartial third party, system operated by a non-regulatory third-party agency.
Independence from the regulatory authorities allows people to talk freely and encourage
the full disclosure necessary for improvements to be made by substantially removing the
fear of punitive action. Independence can enable the staff in the program to operate it
with disinterest, impartiality, and without pressure to compromise any operational
decisions they are required to make.

Furthermore, Tait and O'Neil (2003) argued that

although it may be difficult to avoid, such organizations should not be the source of
funding for confidential systems since funding a system will inevitably generate the
capacity, real or imagined, to put pressure on the system.
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Wu & Fu (August, 1995, 40) suggested that maritime incidents investigation should be
carried out independently.

Liu (April, 2003, 145-146) noted that both in England and

American, the maritime incidents are investigated by independent organizations.
CHIRP is also maintained by the CHIRP charitable Trust, an independent, charitable
organization.
IMO’s Resolution (IMO, 1999) A.849 (20) and A.884 (21) about guidelines of marine
accident investigation also recommends separate, not for blame investigations of
maritime accidents.

U.K. Maritime Accident Investigation Board, U.S. National

Transportation Safety Board are both independent investigating organization. In this way,
it will facilitate finding true causes of the reported incidents. Powell (2004) noted that
this independent assessment of the depersonalized issues helps ensure that the maximum
potential safety benefit can be realized.

CHIRP for the maritime industry is being

funded by the UK Department for Transport. The CHIRP program (2003) revealed
that the independent charitable status of CHIRP ensures its impartiality in dealing with
all reports received, no matter which organization may become involved in subsequently
remedying any reported problems.
Vollenhoven (2004), Chairman of the Dutch Transport Safety Board (DTSB) addressed
that:
Because independent investigations are the only type of investigation intended
to find out the whole truth about what happened.

No other investigation

serves that purpose, because they pursue other interests. And that includes
criminal inquiries and investigations under civil law.

The purpose of a

criminal inquiry is to find out who was to blame, not to reveal the whole truth.
And possible suspects have the right to remain silent. They do not have to
incriminate themselves (Vollenhoven 2004).
Comparing with accident investigation, the near-miss program will be easier to be
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performed in independent manner.

Because near-misses will attract little attention

from public, politician, regulator and other interested parties, for their limited impact.
5.4 Non-punitive, just reporting culture
Many organizations are quick to allocate blame for failures, and then seek to prevent
recurrence either through disciplinary or “retraining” actions. However, in the vast
majority of situations this is either ineffective, or even counter-productive.

In MAIB

(Marine Accident Investigation Branch) annual report (2000), it states that ‘The dangers
of such an approach are that the real, and underlying, causes of whatever happened are
either ignored or forgotten with the attendant risk that the same thing will happen all
over again.’
It acknowledged that a large proportion of unsafe acts were honest errors’(the kinds of
slips, lapses and mistakes that even the best people can make) and were not truly
blameworthy. Instead, employees who bring such information to their supervisor's
attention should be congratulated, van der Schaaf (2000) emphasizes.

The

International Safety Management (ISM) Code, which strives to rid the shipping industry
of the 'blame culture' and encourage ship operators and seafarers to work together
towards loss prevention.

The promotion of a ‘safety culture’ within the shipping

industry has been identified by IMO as a key priority.
Pidgeon (1991) provides one encompassing definition: A safety culture is the set of
beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles, and social and technical practices that are concerned with
minimizing the exposure of employees, managers, customers and members of the public
to conditions considered dangerous or injurious.

Any effective safety information

system depends crucially on the willing participation of the workforce, the front line
workers who are in direct contact with hazard. The program should focus on problem
finding, instead of proportion blame.

The reporter should be guaranteed immunity.

Trust is the primary lubricants of the reporting system.
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employee, manager, regulator, etc.

On this matter, (Borbidge, 2004) states that ‘In the

words of a great teacher/philosopher:

Tell me and I will forget…Show me and I will

remember… Involve me and I will understand. And adding our words: Recognize me
and I will do it again and again.’
To gather near miss, Madsen (2002, p.161) suggested that an effective reporting culture
alongside a healthy safety culture is essential to the organization.

Since the prevailing

‘safety culture’ determines the way safety issues are addressed in an organization.
Reason (2000) suggests that establishing a “reporting culture” depends on trust being a
key element of the safety culture.

He describes a Just Culture as an atmosphere of

trust in which people are encouraged, even rewarded, for providing essential
safety-related information.

A Just Culture supports learning from unsafe acts in order

to improve the level of safety awareness through the improved recognition of safety
situations and helps to develop conscious articulation and sharing of safety information.
Employees will be willing to report safety concerns because they believe it is their
responsibility to do so.
Disciplinary action will only be considered in clearly defined occasions. However,
even in the case of a deliberate violation, it is important to understand why it took place
and whether the procedure was workable and correct and whether there were extraneous
pressures that may have contributed to the individual act.
5.5 Confidential
The National Healthcare System (NHS, 2004) concluded that a review of incident
reporting systems in other industries and other countries illustrates the very high
importance they have placed on protecting the confidentiality of incident data to ensure
the integrity of their reporting system.

Incident reporting systems rely on gathering

data from individuals about their mistakes and guaranteeing that their identities will
never revealed to a third party, especially to their employer or licensing authority.
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Some may argue that since aim to protect reporters, why not use anonymous manner.
Anonymous systems enable contributors to entirely hide their identity.

However,

Heinrich (2001) argued that, confidential systems allow the limited disclosure of identity
but only to trusted parties.

The important distinction between an anonymous and a

confidential reporting system lies in the fact that, with an anonymous reporting system
the reporter will submit unidentifiable reports. O'Leary and Chappell (1996, 12) point
out, however, that anonymity is not always possible or desirable.

An anonymous

report offers no possibility to derive further facts in the investigation process.

Analysts

cannot contact reporters for more information; anonymous reports may be unreliable.
Anonymity may also be criticized for its threat to accountability and transparency, both
at variance with the ethics of professionalism.
It may, Barach (2000) suggested that, however, be important to provide anonymity early
in the evolution of an incident reporting system, at least until trust is built and reporters
see practical results.

However, with a confidential system the reporter will submit their

name, and can thus be contacted during the investigation process for further clarification
and feedback purposes.

This can be achieved by de-identifying individuals in reports,

guaranteeing protection from disciplinary action.
the employee and no copies are made.

The report form is then returned to

Thereafter it is impossible to link a particular

report to a particular employee. For example, Tamuz (2003) reviews that ASRS uses
de-identification of both individuals and airlines to ensure that reports are not used as a
basis for regulatory enforcement, disciplinary action, or litigation.

After return of

personal details, CHIRP is unable subsequently to contact the reporter. However, it
was also argued that in the longer term the culture of the industry would be such as to
make confidential reporting unnecessary.
5.6 Feedback
Reporting needs to be encouraged and responded to constructively. Once near-miss
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reports are submitted, it is important to respond to them. Reporting can be encouraged
by acknowledgement and recognition.

Giving feedback timely let reporters know that

they are not doing something useless.

Feedback keeps staff ‘in the loop’.

The

investigating staff can issue a receipt of a report and confirm that it is being investigated.
In a well-run system, they can see that their concerns are treated seriously and are acted
upon by the organization.

Providing feedback to staff about reportable events is an

important step in the quality improvement process.

U.K. National Healthcare System

(NHS, 2003) addressed formal recognition that reporting incidents results in visible or
tangible system improvements supports and fosters a safety culture.
Johnson (2000) noted, research into the effectiveness of incident reporting systems in
other domains has stressed the importance of providing the individuals who contribute to
an incident reporting scheme with direct feedback about the effect of their contributions
on fundamental and long running concerns.
5.7 Voluntary
Since the object of any confidential reporting scheme is to gather data on incidents that
generally are not made visible to third parties, there is no function in attempting to make
such a scheme mandatory since it will inevitably be up to the individual concerned
whether to make a report or not.

For instance, U.K. Bureau of Transportation Statistics

(BTS, 2005) reviews that, in addition to the mandatory requirements of major accident
reporting, an explicit recommendation to report near misses to MARS is operated on a
voluntary basis.

Within the United States, voluntary reports have been the prevalent

source of information concerning unsafe acts.
The American Medical Association (AMA) and the American Hospital Association
(AHA) oppose mandatory reporting and believe that any reporting that is tied to punitive
action or public disclosure will encourage making the reporting system a “numbers
game” and drive reporting underground by perpetuating a culture of blame.
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However, the public feels that mandatory reporting improves accountability.

Clearly,

both voluntary and mandatory approaches are required, each with their own benefits and
limitations. For instance, because of pressure from public, relatives of victims and
politicians, the accidents with great damage both to environment and property, injuries
or death, need to be mandatory reported and thoroughly investigated.
5.8 Operate in wide scope
The level of a reporting system is used to distinguish between local, national and
international initiatives.

In this paper, a national level reporting system is

recommended.
The scope of a system defines the groups who are expected to participate in the scheme.
There are important differences between national and regional reporting systems.
example, it can be easier to guarantee anonymity in national systems.

For

Reports that are

submitted to local systems often contain sufficient details for others to infer the identity
of individuals who are involved in an adverse event.

Barach (2000) argued that,

national systems are more likely to be protected by legal guarantees of confidentiality.
Beyond this, National systems have correspondingly greater coverage of the whole
industry, which facilitates recommendations to be widely shared.

Furthermore, more

reports may be received and better statistical data can be derived from them.
Section 9 of the ISM Code requires reporting not only accidents but also hazardous
occurrences, near-misses and non-conformities, Anderson (2001) noted.

However,

Captain, Beedel (2002) argued: ‘This is all very commendable but, even if the reports
are published within the company, they are kept ‘in-house’ and nobody else benefits
from them.’
In addition, U.K. National Healthcare System (NHS, 2004) addressed that research has
shown that some staff welcomes a national system because they feel it will give greater

30

Chapter V:

the characteristics of an effective near miss program

weight to local reporting and that incidents will be taken more seriously at management
and board level.
Mariners who move around the service and spend most of their time on the sea have to
become familiar with different systems in different local organizations.

There is often

a lack of clarity about what issues to report, how to report them and to whom.

Dislike

other industries, such as aviation, nuclear, healthcare sectors in which people live and
work in a relative fixed place.

It is not practicable or convenient to use a local

reporting system in maritime industry.

Operating near-miss reporting system in

national level will be a better choice. Ideally, in a long run, if it is possible, operating in
international level will facilitate wide information sharing.
5.9 Simple in form, easy to report
Since most seafarers have being suffering overloaded paperwork, under the requirements
both by convention (or regulation) and by company, it is important to prevent reporters
from feeling reporting is a burden.

Oktem (2002) notes that, the procedure for

reporting and collecting incidents must be simple, straightforward and easily understood
by all staff to encourage everyone who observes or experiences a problem to fill-out a
report without spending much time and effort.

Also, various ways to submit the reports

should be available.
A simply, user-friendly standardized format for reporting (on paper or e-form) should be
available to all participants of this program.

A report that requires selection from lists

of possible events assists with ease of reporting because check-off boxes reduce the time
involved in completing the report.

Each reporting form can contain a series of

pre-defined fields that describe the relevant conditions that immediately preceded the
incident. Space is also provided for a text-based narrative so that the reporter can
provide additional details, such as causal/contributing factors, the chain of events, and
suggestions for preventing the event’s reoccurrence.
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It is important to capture as many near-misses as possible even though not all of them
will have the same importance. By keeping reporting simple and narrative, and by
allowing workers to use their own words to describe a situation, employees are more
likely to share.

The key is to learn what types of near-misses are occurring, not

necessarily all the details involved in the occurrence.
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Although there are so many barriers, successful near-miss programs are attainable.
Near-miss management systems have been developed and are implemented across a
range of industries.

Near-miss management can be systematized and managed to

provide an important reinforcing element of accident prevention and preparedness at
hazardous facilities.

To do so, it requires a well designed infrastructure for identifying,

reporting, analyzing and disseminating the results of near misses. In addition, the
system needs to be periodically evaluated and audited to maintain its effectiveness. In
this chapter, this paper will identify key processes of a systematic near-miss
management program in maritime industry, as shown in Figure 2.

Identification

Reporting

Classification

Analyzing

Recommendation
& dissemination

Follow-up

Figure 2: the process of near miss management
6.1 Identification:
To successfully identify a near miss, individuals must recognize an incident or a
condition, with potential for serious consequence.

If not identified, disclosed and

properly managed the incident may be forgotten and the latent potential for damage
remains.

Different reporting systems have different definitions of what should and

what should not be reported.

The range of near-misses reported depends on how they
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Participants should know what types of events to report and they could

recognize them when they occur. Even highly knowledgeable individuals can have
different views of the meaning of accident precursors, which can substantially affect the
range of incidents reported. To harvest value from a near-miss it must be clearly
identified.
6.2.1

Clear definition

Definitions vary from highly specific criteria (such as exceeding a specific quantitative
threshold) to broad definitions that encompass a wide range of events and circumstances.
Oktem (2002) noted that setting the threshold for reporting too high or defining
reportable precursors too precisely may mean that risk-significant events may not be
reported, valuable information could be lost. However, U.S. National Academy (NA,
2003) argued that too low a reporting threshold can lead to a perception that the
reporting system is of little value.
Broader definitions can increase the probability of identifying potential problems at their
earliest stages.

Tamuz (1994) emphasizes that the use of broad ambiguous definitions

of potential dangers aids discovery of risks that escape existing definitions.

To have an

effective near miss system there is an overwhelming need for an encompassing and
helpful near-miss definition. The definition has two-folds:
Firstly, it should address the importance of near miss as valuable opportunity to find
the weakness and strength of the system. If the underling hazard is timely identified
and remedied, the likelihood of the incident recurring is greatly reduced or
eliminated. If not identified, disclosed and properly managed the incident may be
forgotten and the latent potential for damage remains.
Secondly, it should include these incidents below the threshold of existing accidents
reporting scheme.
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For this reason, Phimister, Oktem, Kleindorfer and Kunreuther (2000) define near-miss
as: ‘An opportunity to improve environmental, health and safety practice based on a
condition, or an incident with potential for more serious consequence.’

It is based on

the elements depicted in Figure 3:

Figure 3: Broad definition of near miss
Source: Phimister (2000).

In maritime sector, the author defines near-miss as: Conditions, behaviors, incidents that
have potential to cause injury (or life loss), property damage (or loss), environmental
damage; or conditions, behaviors, incidents that have caused injury, property damage (or
loss), environmental damage, but below the threshold of existing reporting system.
6.2.2

Who should report?

Seafarers, port state control officers, VTS staff, worker in port, maritime administrators,
ship company staff, agents, cargo owners and other interested individuals or
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organizations should submit near-miss report.
6.2.3

What should be reported?

According the definition, the following events or conditions should be reported:
A procedure or practice that would endanger the safety of the ship or a person, such
as unsafe navigation;
Defective life saving or fire fighting equipment;
Extreme corrosion of the hull;
Crew schedules resulting in fatigue;
Unreported accidents and near-misses and unsafe condition;
Ineffective regulations;
The recovery information
Oktem (2002) suggested that the reporting system should extend to security issues.
The September 11th attacks followed by the anthrax problems and various other threats
increased the awareness of the terrorism risk, not only in the United States but also in
countries around the world.

There has been a heightened awareness and an increased

emphasis on security for all commercial operations, so does in maritime industry.
People should look at a problem not only from the safety and environmental perspective
but also from the security perspective.
6.2 Training
It is the skills, performance and attitudes of people that will determine success and
ensure incidents are handled in a consistent and effective manner.
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of this program is established, and the definition of near miss is defined, the training of
all persons who will be involved is fundamental.
In practice, it would be helpful to develop a list of in-context examples that illustrate
what people consider to be near misses.

Authority can approve special lists of

occurrences that must be reported. Guideline addressing the procedure of reporting
should also be available to all participants to inform them which incidents should be
reported and how to report.

Thomas (2002) suggested that by developing

comprehensive training programs, using a variety of different approaches to raise safety
awareness and help users clarify definitions and terminology standard templates for
reporting procedures, risk assessment frameworks and methodologies is critical to this
program.

Ensure that all participants understand the importance and value of near-miss

reporting for safety improvement and willing to invest the time to investigate near
misses, including spending overtime labor if necessary.
6.2.1

Improve awareness

Improve awareness of safety, environment protection, and the value of near miss in risk
management in all level of participants, including the operators, managers, politicians,
administrators, public and other interested parties related maritime industry.

Especially,

through training the providers can increase their willingness to report safety information.
6.2.2

Ensure familiar with definitions and procedures

Although near miss is not a new concept, but the definition always confused people.
Maybe everyone has their own criteria in mind.

For instance, someone only view the

incidents with minor damage as near-misses. Generally, on board, only officers or
engineers are familiar with the procedure of incident reporting and the way to clear
narrate the events.

Majority of seamen seldom do this kind of work.

Through

training, the participants will know what to report, as well as how to submit reports.

37

Chapter VI:

the process of near-miss management

The investigators will know how to keep confidentiality when they deal with these
collected data.

In addition, after being familiar with the procedure, the participants will

feel less afraid of being identified and punished based on the information they provided.
6.2.3

Improve skills

There are clear problems in interpreting the evidence provided by an initial report of an
incident.

The problems of interpreting eye witness statements are not simply related to

the difficulty of assessing non-technical accounts of system failures. Individuals may
not be able to observe the consequences of the adverse events that they witness.

They

need be well trained to fill the reporting forms properly, so that complete information
will be submitted.
In addition, Heinrich (2001) and Ayeko (2002, p.125) argued that the process of
analyzing near misses, developing recommendations is typically a complex and skilled
task. In respect of skills, Tamuz (2003) insisted that such an expertise must include the
ability to effectively analyze data received ensuring of developing preferred
recommendations which are appropriately specific, and therefore easier to implement.
They should be familiar with the objective, the procedure, the analyzing methods, the
terminologies, and have experience of maritime affairs.
Specially, experts with knowledge of human factors should be included, since human
error continues to be the dominant factor in maritime accidents, and it is a great
challenge to analyze human factors contributing to incidents.

The statistics made by

American Bureau of Shipping (ABS, 2004, p.3) revealed that for all accidents over the
reporting period, approximately 80 to 85% of the accidents analyzed involved human
error. Of these, about 50% of maritime accidents were initiated by human error, and
another 30% of were associated with human error.

The characteristics of people that

lead to unsafe situations cover a wider range, particularly their errors, which are unique
to each situation, including the psychological and physical characteristics of people, the
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hardware and software with which they interact, and the surrounding physical, social,
and organizational environments in which activity takes place.

The staff is necessary

to fully appreciate the cognitive backgrounds of the human error model, and to ensure an
objective and uniform approach in describing, classifying and interpreting the reported
events, van der Schaaf (1995) emphasized.
6.3 Collecting reports
To successfully identify a near-miss, individuals must recognize an incident or a
condition, with potential for serious consequence.

Reporting are vital in providing a

core of sound, representative information on which analysis and recommendations can
be based.

Wiegmann (2002) addressed that an effective and systematic reporting

system is the keystone to identifying the weakness and vulnerability of safety
management before an accident occurs.

Reporting should be made very simple to

encourage everyone who observes or experiences a problem to fill-out a report without
spending much time and effort.

A key objective is to create reporting systems in an

open and fair culture so that staff can report freely and in confidence.

In this process,

various ways can be used to collect as much as possible valuable near misses and make
sure such information is accurate and sufficient. The prevention of reporters’ identities
from be released to public or any other third parties is critical important.
Once receiving reports, the staff should review the contents in the reporting forms, and
evaluate the information, if necessary, they can contact with reporters for further
information to ensure the reports are complete and accurate. When entering these data
into database, the reports shall be de-identified to remove all information mentioning the
identities of the reporters, companies, ships, witnesses, etc. This process shall be
rechecked by other members of the center.
When determine in which way the seafarers can report near-misses, their unique work
environment different from other industry should be taken into consideration. The way
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should be easy to access through a variety of reporting methods, including telephone,
internet, mail, and automatic recording.
6.3.1

Mail

In order to encourage reporting, the center can distribute post-free envelopes with
pre-printed address of reporting center to seafarers and other participants. The mail can
also be sent directly to reporting center or be transferred by staff working in medical
examination centers where seafarers have to get examined periodically.

The

precondition is that they can get the reporting forms and envelopes easily.
6.3.2

Telephone

Free hot-lines can be arranged to facilitate reporters who witness or perpetrate near
misses report if they want.
6.3.3

E-form

By providing standard and user-friendly e-Forms on the reporting center website,
reporters can send near miss information fast through internet. The ease of electronic
or online event reporting has been shown to reduce under-reporting, improve timeliness,
and contribute to managers’ ‘real time’ knowledge of near misses for early intervention.
As Healthcare Risk Control (HRC) System (May, 2003) addressed, some computerized
event reporting systems have boasted considerable decreases in event report turnaround
times and significant savings in data-entry time.
6.3.4

Automatic recording:

One additional source of information on unsafe situations involves automated methods
of data collection.

The reporting of incidents takes time, and is dependent on both the

ability and willingness of informants to report events accurately. Most witnesses do
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their best to remember events but there will be many gaps in the information they can
provide.

U.K. Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS, 2005) suggested that advances

in technology offer the opportunity to record events automatically in a way that will
allow the nature and origins to be ascertained and verified objectively.
Data recorders are now commonplace in many forms of transport and have made a
substantial contribution to the understanding of incident causes and the improvement of
safety.

Lang & Beer (1999, p.199) suggested that recorded data has enabled accident

investigators to reconstruct events to identify precisely what went wrong and to ensure
that effective, rather than convenient, recommendations can be made to prevent the same
thing happening again. The mandatory fitting of flight deck recorders and cockpit
voice recorders in most commercial aircraft has made a major impact to the
improvement of safety in the air.

As “black box” on vessels the Voyage Data Recorder

(VDR) can record and save the data gauging system and personnel performance as well
as operating status so that analysis can be made when the ship arrives next port.
6.3.5

Others

Additionally, Lang & Beer (1999, 202) recommended that other sources of recorded
data are becoming available including recorded radio channels, vessel traffic system
(VTS) shore radars, closed circuit television and privately operated video cameras which
are getting widely used around the world.

Clarke (1998) also suggested that alternate

means of data collection include periodic interviews, questionnaires.
6.4 Preliminary filtering, Classification
Ideally, all near-misses, no matter how minor, should be reported.

However, as Vander

der Schaaf and Kanse (2004) reviewed, if a large number of reports are submitted, it is
impossible to analyze all of them.

Resource constraints may make it difficult to have

the right focus and to identify the most important problems highlighted in the reported
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They are subjected to further prioritization and filtering. For example, U.S.

National Academy (NA, 2003) noted that, ASRS receives about 2,900 reports a month,
only 15 to 20 percent of which are logged because of resource constraints. ASRS
analysts first classify reports by their safety significance. It is important to set criteria for
prioritization, Oktem (2002) noted.

In addition, there must be recognition that the

reporting of an event is not necessarily a prejudgment of its risk significance (U.S. NA,
2003).
Classification schemes provide key terms that can be used to access incident data in
large, national databases. “filtering” allows classifying near misses into two categories,
high or low priority, by comparing potential damage, loss or injury against a given
criteria.

Only in the case of more significant or complicated events is additional

analysis and detailed investigation necessary. In this way, we can reduce the number
of events requiring in-depth analysis to a more manageable figure.

However, to

determine the potential harm of a reported near miss is much based on creative activities
such as brain storming sessions.

U.K. Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS, 2005)

argued that it is particularly challenging for causes arising from the human component.
ASRS analysts first classify reports by their safety significance.

If a report has safety

potential, it is carefully examined and coded. Tamuz (2000) suggested that potentially
significant events are further classified as: (1) urgent situations that require immediate
intervention or (2) events that warrant in-depth analysis and coding by ASRS safety
analysts. Furthermore, these near misses need to be classified according to kinds of
incidents or contributing factors.
A limited number of investigators are responsible for processing these forms.

However,

all identifying information is removed from the report before it is submitted for further
analysis.

From this point of view, it is impossible to link a particular report to a

particular employee, or organization.
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6.5 Causal analysis
A Chinese Proverb says "To get rid of weeds, dig up the root; to stop a pot from boiling,
withdraw the fuel."
the root causes.
hindsight bias.

A systematic in-depth analysis of incidents is necessary to identify
Incidents should be reviewed and investigated fairly, free from

Root cause is defined as the most basic or fundamental reason for an

undesirable condition or problem which, if eliminated or corrected, would have
prevented recurrence of this and similar occurrences.

Root cause analysis requires that

both the direct and indirect cause of incidents to be determined. The causes may be
technical, human behaviors, organizational culture, process, procedure, equipment,
environment, etc. It helps to determine whether the presence or absence of certain
factors increases the probability that an incident will occur.
Research has shown that a typical accident is the result of many related and unrelated
factors that somehow all come together at the same time, for instance the integration of
working practices, working environment, line management and regulatory intervention
together support a catalytic or triggering failure, as indicated in Figure 4.
Nation Healthcare System (NHS, 2002) suggested that the analysts should keep asking
the questions “How” and “Why” to determine the most probable underlying causes of
problems and undesired events within an organization.

For instance, "Failure of

employee to wear required personal protective equipment" is a common cause, in which
case you need to find out why supervisors are not consistently enforcing the wearing of
the equipment or are not training employees in what is required.
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Figure 4: Modified Reason’s cheese model
Source: Kirsch (2005)

Because, generally it is impossible to investigate near misses on scene, or directly
contact with witnesses. So the process of analyzing near misses includes subjective
components, in other words, brain storming sessions.

It is important to emphasize that

subjective judgments need not be ‘a bad thing’. Heinrich (2001) argued that, it reflects
the expertise and experience of the investigator.
Other valuable information can be concluded from the near miss analysis are the
recovery information and the barriers in the system still working, which can be used for
safety improvement in similar circumstances in the future.

44

Chapter VI:

5.5.1

the process of near-miss management

Focus on system

Usually when incidents happen, operators are blamed or exhorted to ‘try better, next
time’.

Heinrich (2001) argued that, correspondingly less attention is placed on the

organizational, technical and environmental circumstances which contributed to an
incident.
Leveson (2003, p.500) pointed out that, this program has contributed to the popularity of
systemic theories as an explanation of incident causation. In this view, individual
errors rarely create the causes of an adverse event. Instead, Johnson (2004) insisted
that we must look at the complex conjunction of managerial, regulatory and even
legislative constraints that jeopardized the safety of a more general system.

Reason

(2000) uses a mosquito-control analogy, suggesting that rather than swat mosquitoes one
by one, the better remedies are to create more effective defenses and to drain the
swamps in which the mosquitoes breed.
Christopher (2003) and Liu (2002, 27) noted that instead of focusing primarily on the
operator (e.g., with more regulation, punishment, or training), it is time that we also
focus on the system in which operations are performed.

Similarly, Itoh (2002, 144)

addressed that it has been observed that organizational problems are frequently latent
causal factors that contribute to the occurrence of human errors made by frontline
personnel.

IMO (2000) addressed that peoples are essentially human system

components involved in complex interactions with other system components such as
machinery, equipment, procedures, and other humans, in an operating environment, to
accomplish a certain mission objective.

As behavioral psychologist, through

quantitative research Reason and Hobbs (2003, p.96) found that, human error is
inevitable for a number of physiological and psychological factors); human error is not
intrinsically bad, because Success and failure spring from the same roots.

Ayeko (2002,

p.116) argued that when a failure occurs and causes are attributed to “human error”, the
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people on the scene are not always at the root of the problem.
5.5.2

Analysis techniques:

In order to objectively assess events, an adequate structured event investigation
methodology has to be applied, which leads to the identification of appropriate root
causes by which relevant corrective actions are established, implemented. Many tools
are available to aid the analysis phase.

However as Jacinto and Aspinwall (2003, p.3)

said, so far none has been universally accepted; each single model presents a
specific/limited view of the problem. Each has its own strengths and weaknesses and
preferred realms of application.
on management failure.

Some may focus on human element; some may focus

Therefore, it is not possible to recommend any single

technique. The use of one or a combination of techniques in event analysis should
ensure identification of the relevant causes and contributing factors which aid in the
development of effective corrective actions.
It also should be noticed that each technique will achieve different results, so the method
selected should be appropriate to the specific situation. In addition, costs vary with
each technique, so choosing a technique may depend on resources and the perceived
severity or plausible, worst-case consequences of the event or condition. Sklet (2004)
suggested that, each of the methods has different areas of application and qualities and
deficiencies, such that a combination of methods ought to be used in a comprehensive
investigation of a complex incident.
The most common root cause analysis methods are: Cause and Effect Analysis, Change
analysis, Events and Causal Factors Charting, SHELL model, Barrier Analysis, etc.
5.5.3

Use software

Since there is great number of near-misses needed to be analyzed, the use of
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comprehensive toot cause analysis (RCA) software may facilitate a quick analysis and
ease the burden of the investigation process and documentation of the results. Dunn
(2004) said that, a growing number of Root Cause Analysis processes are being
supported by RCA software. The software prompts the user to think about problem
causes using some form of hierarchical outline or “pick list” which users use to identify
problem causes.
However, it need to be noted that a predefined hierarchy is likely to represent the biases
of whoever created the categorization scheme, and this may not reflect, or include, the
causes that are relevant to the problem being solved.
number of levels) of causes.

There are an infinite number (and

Experience says that most people will restrict their

thinking to those causes that are contained in the software. We need to be careful not
to oversell the benefits of software in effective problem solving, Dunn (2004) suggested.
There are generally many smaller problems that can be solved more or less immediately,
simply through the use of software.

Nevertheless, using RCA software can save time

dramatically. The outcomes can be revised manually if necessary.
6.6 Identifying Solutions
There are some principles to be followed during this process. Johnson (2004) argued
that root cause analysis will never yield ‘zero incidents’ and so questions must be asked
about the cost effectiveness both of the recommendations that are produced and of the
analysis that is performed to identify those recommendations.
Firstly, for each of the contributing factors and/or causes of the incidents a corrective
recommendations should be achievable and reasonable, and in a cost-effective manner.
It does not require everything possible to prevent an accident but only what is
“reasonably practicable”.

The potential risk should be compared with the cost of

removing or reducing it, in money, time and trouble.
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disproportion between them it is not necessary to remove or reduce the risk. This
process is based on qualitative analysis, and is quite subjective. When developing
corrective actions, safety and environmental considerations must be of paramount
importance.
Secondly, the recommendations shall not be too general.

If the recommendations that

are proposed for dealing with Organizational Causes are too generic in nature, then it
becomes more difficult to implement them.

Dunn (2004) suggested that the

recommendations should be appropriately specific, and therefore easier to implement.
For example, if an engineer on board doesn’t know how to properly use Oil-water
separator.

The solution should not be simply defined to enhance training.

The

barriers to stop an unskilled engineer to work on board need to be identified and
remedied.
Corrective actions can be immediate, interim or long term necessitating detailed
evaluation. It need to be noted that generating too many actions may overwhelm the
intended beneficiary and leave some important ones outstanding for too long.

The

success of this process is quite based on skill and experiences.
6.7 Dissemination
Participation by multiple parties in information sharing can often amplifies the benefits
derived from the information.

Oktem (2002) and Heinrich (2001) suggested that the

program should broadly disseminate de-identified, applicable, system improvement
information to further encourage and promote safety improvements. U.S. National
Academy (NA, 2003) addressed that if a member of an industry experiences a problem
and fixes it, every other member can benefit from that member’s experience without
having to encounter the problem.

For example, in ASRS program the safety

information identified from near miss analysis is distributed to more than 85,000 pilots,
air traffic controllers and others in the aviation industry, as Heinrich (2001) noted.
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As mentioned in chapter V, through disseminating related safety information to
participants, the reporters will be encouraged to submit near miss information, since they
feel they are doing something meaningful, not only to others, but to themselves.
One thing is important that, before dissemination any identities of individuals or
organizations from the information must be removed, otherwise, the trust which is
fundamental to the success of such systems will be destroyed.

Klampfer and Grote

(1999) addressed that this can lead to a difficult ethical decision in which investigators
might choose not to release important information about a potential hazard in order to
safeguard the longer term future of the reporting system.
This system must go beyond repeated reminders to be careful if they are to preserve the
confidence of those who contribute to them, because immediate remedies to individual
incidents will fail to address the root cause of a problem.

The ASRS recognize this by

issuing two different forms of feedback in response to the reports that they receive. The
Callback bulletin describes short-term fixes to immediate problems.

In contrast,

Heinrich (2001) pointed out that, the DirectLine journal addresses more systemic causes
of adverse events and near misses even if it has a more limited audience than its sister
publication.
Attention should be paid to the fact that, in the process of implementation, corrective
actions developed in response to near miss data may be less persuasive and more open to
question than corrective actions based on actual accidents.
6.7.1

The destination of dissemination

To regulators.

They can make new regulations or revise existing ones in relation

to safety and environmental protection based on the information.
To seafarers, stevedores and other operators in the frontlines. They can be kept
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reminding their behaviors and operations.
To administrators.

Such information can facilitate them to adjust their managing

style, procedure and correct their mistakes.
Training

institution

(including

maritime

colleges).

According

to

the

recommendations they can adjust the knowledge structure or methods of training.
To companies.

Dissemination of information about these errors and their root

causes to permit marine companies, where appropriate, to redesign their systems,
change policies, procedures, equipment, and, if necessary, personnel to prevent
future events.
Others with whom there are agreements.
6.7.2

Ways to dissemination

The information can be shared in a variety of ways within an organization.

The way of

dissemination can be, through printing feedback (or newsletter) periodically or direct
access to web center. For example, in The U.K. Confidential Human Factors Incident
Reporting Program periodical publications such as Feedback and Callback, as well as
Direct Line, play a critical role in increasing the visibility of these common occurrences
(CHIRP, 2000).
Increasingly, electronic information systems are being used to reduce the costs
associated with paper-based distribution. Databases can be established to provide the
public with access to summary information.
6.7.3

Access to the database

The data compilation activities should be performed under carefully defined
confidentiality restrictions.

Only de-identified information is available to public.
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Besides, the database can also be available to scholars who are interested for second
analysis or research, to develop their own opinion.
6.7.4

Internationally sharing

Within the maritime industry there are great benefits to be gained by sharing information
and experience internationally.
reporting programs.

By now, only few states have launched near-miss

They set up their own databases, and issue their own reports, and

pay great efforts on the programs.
full used around the whole industry.

However, such valuable outcomes are not getting
As a result, someone is still repeating the errors

which have been identified and remedied by others.
There is a need to make international standards or guidelines to be followed by all
member states of IMO to facilitate international co-ordination among these systems.
6.7.5

Cross-industry information sharing

Although, each industry has unique characteristics comparing with other industries, they
can also shamelessly learn from each other.

Such as, issues related human elements,

management, regulatory, legal are similar to some extend among different industries.
Greater cross-industry sharing of safety information could be widely beneficial.
6.8 Follow-up
Johnson (2004) discussed that once solutions are identified and implementers are
informed, it is important to track all suggested changes to ensure that they are properly
executed. Follow-up includes determining if corrective action has been effective in
resolving problems, and the safety information has been widely shared.

Whether the

recommended resolutions are practicable or effective should also be assessed.
This process can be carried out through questionnaire, interview, or checking
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documentary.
6.9 System evaluating and up-dating
An effective near-miss management system can significantly contribute to minimizing
the recurrence of accidents.

The near miss system need to be periodically checked if it

is performing up to the expectations set-forth as part of its design, Oktem (2002)
suggested. As Healthcare Risk Control (HRC) System (May, 2003) suggested, the
evaluation of reporting system should be undertaken to determine not only how effective
it is in capturing information on near misses, but even more so, how effective it is in
improving systems and procedures.

As U.S. Occupational Safety and Health

Administration (OSHA, 1997) addressed, the purpose of this review is to evaluate the
overall process effectiveness and to recommend remedial measures to resolve any
weaknesses if identified.

Relatively low level of reporting may be the indicator of poor

management.
U.S. National Academy (NA, 2003) mentioned another reason why the program needs to
be evaluated is to share the resulting information with the people expected to participate
in the program to encourage them to continue their participation.
The following methods are going to be used:
Compare the accidents statistics with old date. Through which people can assess the
effectiveness of the program.
Evaluate the weakness and strength of the cause analyzing models being used.
Evaluate the reporting level and analyze the sources of the reports. To find out the
reporting structure, in other words, to identify what kind of participants are willing
to or have reported near misses.
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To find out whether the participants are familiar with the program,

the definition, terminology, the procedure, collect their comments and
recommendations, and evaluate their willingness to report.
U.S. National Academy (NA, 2003) stressed that experiences of operating and
maintaining such a system, the outcomes of near-miss analysis regarding management
failure and human elements, categorizing methods, cause analysis techniques, etc, in
different industries are valuable for others. In this respect, sharing and advancing
approaches for predicting, modeling, managing, and mitigating risk exposure based on
precursor information will have cross-industry benefit.
In this way, the weakness of the program can be identified timely, certain solutions
based on the evaluation can be developed for improving and up-dating the program.
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Chapter VII: Conclusion
Marine incidents have the potential to cause significant loss of life and substantial
environmental damage.

Yet many incidents are often repeated before lessons are

learned and any action is taken.

Generally, some major accidents have been carried out

in-depth investigation through which to clarify the basic, contributing and immediate
causes to such accidents as well as identifying the appropriate measures to prevent the
occurrence of similar events in the future, as Roed (2004, p.1) noted.

Maritime

industry has been criticized as being limited and reactive by solving yesterday’s
problems.

Heinrich’s pyramid revealed that behind a major accident there are 300

minor accidents or near-misses. A Near-miss is an unplanned and unforeseen event
which does not cause injury or damage but which could result in injury or loss under
different circumstances.

It is argued that the only difference between near-miss and

actual accident is luck. Considering Murphy’s Law “if it can happen, it will happen.”
Near misses represent inexpensive learning opportunities for analyzing the strength and
weakness of a system.
However, a number of near-misses were ignored and under-reported for various reasons:
Be afraid of being punished, Work overload, safety bias, lack of resources, difficult to
submit the report, business pressure, etc.
The near-miss program in maritime industry is intended to identify and neutralize factors
could cause accidents or vessel trouble through a proactive, preventive approach.
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program focuses on system weaknesses and finding remedy actions, instead of blaming
individual, as Bridges (2000) mentioned.

The whole process is done under non-blame,

confidential, independent manner, in order to protect reporters and encourage their
reporting. It was also argued that in the longer term the culture of the industry would
be such as to make confidential reporting unnecessary.
In order to cover more valuable opportunities, the program prefer to use a broad
definition of near-miss, aiming to identify any incidents, unsafe behaviors, unsafe
procedures, conditions, that have the potential to cause life injury(or loss), property
damage(or loss), environmental damage, or that have caused such kinds of damage
under the threshold of current reporting scheme.

These collected data will be well

classified and analyzed by skilled staff to find contributing factors, and recommended
remedy actions will be developed and widely disseminated for future accident reduction.
This program can be considered as an important and integral part of a safety
management system in maritime risk management, as Jacinto and Aspinwall (2003, p.7)
said. It is a win-win strategy for everyone involved.
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